Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in Florida: Separation of Powers as a Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform by Logan, Wayne A.
Florida State University College of Law
Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
Summer 2010
Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in Florida:
Separation of Powers as a Tool to Achieve Indigent
Defense Reform
Wayne A. Logan
Florida State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wayne A. Logan, Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in Florida: Separation of Powers as a Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform, 75 Mo. L.
Rev. 885 (2010),
Available at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/175
Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in Florida: 
Separation of Powers as a Tool to Achieve 
Indigent Defense Reform 
Wayne A. Logan* 
Today, the promise long ago heralded by Clarence Gideon’s successful 
appeal1 goes unfulfilled, as public indigent defense systems nationwide oper-
ate in perpetual crisis mode.2  A key difficulty has been that Gideon, while 
surely deserving of landmark status for its recognition that “lawyers in crimi-
nal courts are necessities, not luxuries,”3 failed to provide any guidance on 
how states should afford such assistance.4  This deficit has only worsened 
over time, as the right to counsel has been extended to less serious criminal 
offenders,5 resulting in the infusion of yet more indigent clients, magnifying 
the importance of what Anthony Lewis justly termed an “enormous social 
task.”6    
  
 * Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic 
Affairs, Florida State University College of Law.  Thanks to Ana Marie Barton (J.D. 
2010) for her research assistance. 
 1. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 2. See generally Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in 
Criminal Cases: A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006). 
 3. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
 4. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon’s Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1461, 1462 (2003) (noting same). 
 5. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (extending counsel right to 
misdemeanants receiving suspended sentences); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 
(1972) (extending counsel right to misdemeanants receiving sentence of actual impri-
sonment). 
 6. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 205 (1964); see also PRESIDENT’S 
COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN 
A FREE SOCIETY 151 (1967) (“The shortage of criminal lawyers, which is already 
severe, is likely to become more acute in the immediate future.”).  A few years later, 
the reality was plainly on the minds of members of the Court.  See Argersinger, 407 
U.S. at 52 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the Court’s decision to extend the right 
of appointed counsel to misdemeanants “could have a seriously adverse impact upon 
the day-to-day functioning of the criminal justice system”); id. at 44 (Burger, C.J., 
concurring) (offering that “[t]he holding of the Court today may well add large new 
burdens [to] a profession already overtaxed”).  For a comprehensive overview of the 
system’s current deficiencies, see generally AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON 
LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S 
CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf.   
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In Florida, the difficulty has been in evidence since Gideon was de-
cided,7 prompting the state’s supreme court almost thirty years later to con-
demn the “woefully inadequate funding of the public defenders’ offices, de-
spite repeated appeals to the legislature for assistance.”8  In the Sunshine 
State, however, the standard saga of underfunding and case overloads has 
come with a twist.  Dating back to the 1970s, Florida courts, including its 
supreme court, have repeatedly sought to remedy the situation.  After condon-
ing Gideon’s plight,9 only to have its position repudiated in Gideon and re-
jected by twenty-two other states that filed an opposing amicus brief with the 
Court,10 the Florida judiciary subsequently distinguished itself, forcefully 
insisting upon the representational rights of accused indigents in the face of 
chronic public defender underfunding and case overloads.11   
This judicial assertiveness did not go unnoticed by the Florida Legisla-
ture, which in 2004, without fanfare or notice, took the unusual step of ex-
pressly prohibiting courts from granting public defender motions to withdraw 
on the basis of a conflict of interest deriving from excessive caseload or un-
derfunding.12  The legislative shot across the judiciary’s bow, while not un-
precedented in the recent annals of Florida lawmaking,13 constituted a pro-
vocative challenge to the inherent authority of Florida courts to regulate at-
torney conduct and ensure satisfaction of the Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.    
  
 7. See Public Defenders Form Association, FLA. TIMES UNION, July 3, 1963.  
 8. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit 
Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam).   
 9. See Gideon v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1961), rev’d sub. nom. Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
 10. See Yale Kamisar et al., Gideon at 40: Facing the Crisis, Fulfilling the Fu-
ture, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 135, 139 (2004) (citing amicus and quoting Abe Krash, 
who assisted in representation of Gideon, describing Florida as one of five “laggard” 
states, all in the South); see also MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, 
RULINGS, AND LEGACY 171 (2001) (noting that 45 states at the time afforded indigent 
accused felons the right to counsel). 
 11. See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.  
 12. See FLA. STAT. § 27.5303(1)(d) (2009) (providing that “[i]n no case shall the 
court approve a withdrawal by the public defender . . . based solely upon inadequacy 
of funding or excess workload”). 
 13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.24(1) (2010) (stating that courts have a “duty” to 
uphold the constitutionality of sex offender registration and community notification 
laws and that a court refusing to do so “unlawfully encroaches on the Legislature’s 
exclusive power to make laws and places at risk significant public interests of the 
state.”); see also Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Proce-
dural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1229-30 (1999) (discussing separation of powers implications of 
the law). 
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The provocation went unchallenged until 2008, when public defenders 
in Miami-Dade County filed suit in state court.14  The litigation, emboldened 
by a 2006 ABA Formal Opinion advising defenders to refuse or withdraw 
from cases when excessive caseloads interfere with their capacity for effec-
tive representation,15 was pursued on a pro bono basis by the Miami office of 
the law firm Hogan and Hartson and has justifiably attracted national media 
attention.16  In this Article, I will discuss the Miami-Dade “excessive case-
load” litigation, which continues to unfold in Florida’s appellate courts.  In 
doing so, I will offer some thoughts on the separation of powers implications 
of the aforementioned statute, which, other than a similar provision adopted 
in Colorado17 that has gone unchallenged, stands alone in the nation. 
I.  FLORIDA JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS CLASH  
The Florida Legislature created the Office of the Public Defender in 
1963 to comply with the mandate of Gideon.18  In 1972, the office assumed 
constitutional status as a result of an amendment to the Florida Constitution,19 
and today public defender offices are located in each of Florida’s twenty judi-
cial circuits.20   
The issue of insufficient public defender funding and excess workload 
has been litigated in Florida courts for decades.  In 1980, the Florida Supreme 
Court consolidated two court of appeals cases reaching divergent results on 
the authority of trial courts to grant public defender motions to withdraw, 
based on assertions that excessive caseload precluded their capacity to pro-
  
 14. See State v. Munoz, No. F08-2314 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2008).  
 15. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-411 
(2006).  
 16. See, e.g., Maureen Dimino, Confronting a National Constitutional Crisis: 
Miami-Dade Chief Public Defender Stands His Ground, CHAMPION, Oct. 2008, at 24, 
24 (describing case as involving “a landmark legal challenge”).  
 17. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-2-103(1.5)(b), (c) (2009): 
(b) Upon review of the motion, the court shall determine whether a con-
flict of interest exists that would require withdrawal of the state public de-
fender and appointment of alternate defense counsel. 
(c) For purposes of this article, a “conflict of interest” may include, but 
need not be limited to [citing permissible bases] . . . Case overload, lack of 
resources, and other similar circumstances shall not constitute a “conflict 
of interest.”   
 18. See FLA. STAT. § 27.50 (1963); see also State ex rel. Smith v. Brummer, 443 
So. 2d 957, 959 (Fla. 1984) (“The State of Florida, in order to meet its responsibility 
to provide the assistance of counsel guaranteed to defendants against state action by 
the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution . . . has created this office . . . 
.”).  
 19. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 18.  
 20. See Florida’s 20 Judicial Circuits, http://www.jud10.org/circuits.htm (last 
visited July 14, 2010).  
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vide effective client representation.21  In Escambia County v. Behr, the court 
held that trial courts faced with such motions enjoyed the unfettered discre-
tion to appoint substitute private counsel at the county’s expense, without 
having to specify a lawful ground or special circumstance.22   
Thereafter, Florida public defenders filed motions to withdraw in capital 
and non-capital cases alike, focusing on appellate clients in particular, and 
achieving varied degrees of success.23  The matter came to a head in 1990 
with the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in In re Order on Prosecution of 
Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender.24  The court 
stated that “[w]hen [an] excessive caseload forces the public defender to 
choose between the rights of various indigent criminal defendants he 
represents, a conflict of interest is inevitably created.”25  The court, however, 
hastened to add that,  
while it is true that the legislature’s failure to adequately fund the 
public defender’s offices is at the heart of this problem, and the 
legislature should live up to its responsibilities and appropriate an 
adequate amount for this purpose, it is not the function of this 
Court to decide what constitutes adequate funding and then order 
the legislature to appropriate such an amount.  Appropriation of 
funds for the operation of government is a legislative function.26  
Eight years later, in 1998, with excessive caseloads unabated, the Flori-
da Supreme Court referred to the situation as a “major crisis” and ordered “on 
  
 21. See Dade County v. Baker, 362 So. 2d 151, 152-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) 
(denying motion and stating that judges “do not have authority to appoint special 
assistant public defenders upon the motion of a public defender that he is overworked 
and, therefore, not able to do his job”); State ex rel. Escambia County v. Behr, 354 
So. 2d 974, 975-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (upholding withdrawal and substitutu-
tion of counsel because the office’s caseload “far exceed[ed]” recommended case-
loads and deference was due to trial court’s assessment of the “adequacy of represen-
tation” and “whether the workload is excessive”).  
 22. 384 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1980). 
 23. See, e.g., Terry v. State, 547 So. 2d 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Order on 
Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Pub. Defender, 1989 
WL 142259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Grube v. State, 529 So. 2d 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1988); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Circuit 
Pub. Defender and by Other Pub. Defenders, 523 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1987); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Circuit Pub. 
Defender and by Other Pub. Defenders, 504 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); 
Crow v. State, 500 So. 2d 171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Haggins v. State, 498 So. 2d 
953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (en banc); Schwartz v. Cianca, 495 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Kiernan v. State, 485 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).  
 24. 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990). 
 25. Id. at 1135.  
 26. Id. at 1136.  
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an emergency basis” that the Tenth Judicial Circuit’s public defender accept 
no additional appellate cases, pending further direction from the trial court 
and the appointment of substitute counsel.27  The court observed that the 
“problem of substantial delays [was] . . . not a new issue,” but rather that it 
had come before the court on “multiple occasions” over the last eighteen 
years.28  The record of delay (more than 640 cases at the time of oral argu-
ment) represented “a significant problem of constitutional magnitude that 
must be immediately addressed.”29  
The court recognized that its order, combined with a request that the leg-
islature allocate an emergency fund to pay for such counsel, only represented 
an “immediate short-term solution” to the crisis.30  As a long-term solution, 
the court “encourage[d] . . . creation of a special committee or commission by 
the legislature to examine the structure and funding of indigent representation 
in criminal cases.”31  The court concluded by offering that it “firmly be-
lieve[d] that this type of delay in the criminal justice process . . . can be elim-
inated by a joint effort of all interested parties” and expressed its willingness 
to help “develop a viable solution to this ongoing problem.”32 
The Florida Legislature, however, made clear its disinclination to work 
with the courts.  Only one year later, in 1999, legislators abrogated existing 
caselaw to provide that courts need not accept public defender certifications 
of conflict at face value.33  More importantly, in 2004, the legislature signifi-
cantly altered provisions controlling motions to withdraw, enacting Florida 
Statutes section 27.5303(1)(d) in the wake of a voter-approved state constitu-
tional amendment that both transferred the obligation of funding indigent 
defense from Florida counties to the state,34 and expressly denied Florida 
courts authority “to fix appropriations.”35  The new law specified that “[i]n no 
  
 27. In re Pub. Defender’s Certification of Conflict and Motion to Withdraw Due 
to Excessive Caseload and Motion for Writ of Mandamus, 709 So. 2d 101, 102-03 
(Fla. 1998) (per curiam).   
 28. Id. at 103.  
 29. Id. at 102-03. 
 30. Id. at 103. 
 31. Id. at 104. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See FLA. STAT. § 27.5303(1)(a) (2009): 
The court shall review and inquire or conduct a hearing into the adequacy 
of the public defender’s representations regarding a conflict of interest 
without requiring the disclosure of any confidential communications.  The 
court shall deny the motion to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for 
withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the 
indigent client.   
See also Snelgrove v. State, 921 So. 2d 560, 567 n.11 (Fla. 2005) (noting statutory 
abrogation of Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994)).   
 34. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 14(c), Historical Notes.  
 35. Id. §14(d).  An effort by the Missouri Legislature to put a similar amendment 
before Missouri voters was recently stymied.  See Justine Finney Guyer, Note, Saving 
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case shall the court approve a withdrawal by the public defender . . . based 
solely upon inadequacy of funding or excess workload of the public defender 
. . . .”36  The only permissible bases for finding a conflict of interest are those 
contained in the Uniform Standards for Use in Conflict of Interest Cases, 
which themselves do not mention overload-based conflicts stemming from 
underfunding or workload.37  
The legislature also revamped the state’s system for handling indigent 
defense appointments in instances of public defender conflicts.  In May 2007, 
Florida legislators created five Offices of Criminal Conflict and Civil Re-
gional Counsel (OCCCRC) to be located within the geographic boundaries of 
the five Florida district courts of appeal,38 authorized to hire lawyers under 
the auspices of the Judicial Administration Commission (JAC) in instances of 
conflict.39  The law further provided that if the OCCCRC itself had a conflict, 
the trial court would appoint counsel from a registry of eligible private attor-
neys.40   
The change in approach was in part motivated by the July 2004 constitu-
tional amendment noted earlier, which shifted the burden of funding indigent 
defense from Florida counties to the state.41  If public defenders were to pre-
vail on a withdrawal motion, OCCCRC counsel would be appointed to the 
cases.42  Because the OCCCRC lacks sufficient funding to accept appoint-
ments on a mass scale,43 however, the courts would need to appoint private 
attorneys at significantly greater cost.  From the state’s perspective, the up-
shot of a successful motion by a public defender office very possibly would 
be that the public indigent defense system would grind to a halt, with the in-
dividual public defender office, OCCCRC, and JAC (also due to insufficient 
funding) all potentially being in a position to decline cases. 
  
Missouri’s Public Defender System: A Call for Adequate Legislative Funding, 74 MO. 
L. REV. 335, 357 (2009) (describing a “‘jurisdiction-stripping’ resolution” that would 
have forbidden state courts from ordering legislature to “expend public funds except 
as expressly approved by legislation or the vote of the people”).  
 36. FLA. STAT. § 27.5303(1)(d) (2009). 
 37. § 27.5303(1)(e).  
 38. § 27.511(1), (5). 
 39. §§ 27.53(4), 27.40(1).  
 40. § 27.40(2).  
 41. Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc., 978 So. 2d 134, 138 
(Fla. 2008).  
 42. §§ 27.511(1), 27.40(1).  
 43. See Susannah A. Nesmith, Attorneys for Poor Vow to Spurn Most Felony 
Cases, MIAMI HERALD, June 3, 2008, at 1A (quoting Joseph George, Regional Coun-
sel for Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties, to the effect that his office could not ac-
commodate an additional 2000 cases a month), available at http://www.nacdl.o-
rg/public.nsf/defenseupdates/Florida084.    
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II.  MIAMI-DADE EXCESSIVE CASELOAD LITIGATION  
The modern era of Florida’s excessive caseload litigation dawned in late 
June 2008 when the public defender for the state’s Eleventh Judicial Circuit 
(PD-11), encompassing Miami-Dade County, sought to decline appointment 
in all non-capital felony cases due to a conflict of interest between previously 
and newly appointed clients, arising out of excessive caseload created by 
chronic underfunding.44  After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted 
the PD-11’s motion as to individuals accused of third-degree felonies, based 
on its finding that the office’s excessive caseload provided only minimally 
competent representation.45  The court concluded that the evidence clearly 
established that the PD-11 was in need of relief in order for its lawyers to 
satisfy their constitutional duties and state rules of professional conduct.46  
Thereafter, the state secured a temporary stay of the trial court’s order,47 
and the PD-11 asked that the order be certified to the Florida Supreme Court 
as a matter having great public importance that could have a great effect on 
the administration of justice throughout the state.48  The Third District Court 
of Appeal accepted the certification request on September 24, 2008, explain-
ing that the “case implicates not only the manner in which the criminal justice 
system is structured and funded, but also constitutional separation of powers 
principles as well as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cas-
es.”49  The Florida Supreme Court, however, dismissed the case for lack of 
  
 44. See Motion to Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony 
Cases Due to Conflict of Interest, State v. Munoz, No. F08-2314 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 
23, 2008), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/Motion_ 
to_Appoint_Other_Counsel_Certificate_of_Conflict-Oscar_Munoz.pdf.  For a compi-
lation of pleadings and rulings in the protracted litigation, see Excessive Workload 
Litigation, http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/Excessive_Workload_ 
Pleadings.htm (last visited July 19, 2010).  
 45. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Public Defender’s Motion to 
Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases at 6-7, State v. Lo-
veridge, No. 08-1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ 
Order_on_motion_to_appoint_other_counsel.pdf. 
 46. Id. at 5.  
 47. See Public Defender’s Response to State of Florida’s Emergency Motion for 
Stay, In re Reassignment and Consolidation of Pub. Defender’s Motions to Appoint 
Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases, No. 3D08-2272, (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWork-
load/PDs_Response_to_States_Emergency_Motion_for_Stay.pdf. 
 48. Suggestion for Certification, In re Reassignment and Consolidation of Pub. 
Defender’s Motions to Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony 
Cases at 1, No. 3D08-2272, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 15. 2008), available at 
http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/Suggestion_for_Certification.pdf. 
 49. State v. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 12 So. 3d 798, 800 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).  
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jurisdiction.50  The Third District, re-vested with jurisdiction, then addressed 
the matter and issued its opinion on May 13, 2009.51     
After reversing the trial court’s ruling that the state lacked standing to 
oppose the public defender’s motion,52 the Third District Court of Appeal 
considered the baseline standard by which excessive caseload could be de-
termined.  The court concluded that there exists no “magic number of cases . . 
. where an attorney handling fewer than that number is automatically provid-
ing reasonably competent representation while the representation of an attor-
ney handling more than that number is necessarily incompetent.”53  Further-
more, “even if such a number could be divined, it would certainly only have 
meaning when applied to an individual attorney and not an office as a 
whole.”54  Against this backdrop, the court rejected the public defenders’ 
request for permission to decline cases based on the assertion that PD-11 was 
so overloaded with cases that it could not provide effective representation.  
What was lacking, the Third District held, was evidence that individual attor-
neys were providing inadequate representation to their clients, which could 
not be “proven in the aggregate, simply based on caseload averages and 
anecdotal testimony.”55      
The Third District next focused its attention on Florida Statutes section 
27.5303(1)(d), which precludes withdrawal “solely upon inadequacy of fund-
ing or excess workload of the public defender.”56  The court denied relief, 
noting that any conflicts stemming from underfunding, excessive workload, 
or the prospective inability to represent a client were non-cognizable because 
the bases were absent from those deemed permissible by the legislature.57  
The court also rejected the distinction drawn by the trial court that counsel 
sought to decline new appointments rather than “withdraw” from existing 
cases, thereby falling outside the textual scope of section 27.5303(1)(d).  
Drawing the distinction, the Third District reasoned, would be an “an exercise 
in semantics” and “undo the clear intent of the statute.”58  
The court concluded that a conflict in an individual case could be estab-
lished.  However, again invoking section 27.5303(1)(d), the court declared 
that “such a determination, absent individualized proof of prejudice or con-
flict other than excessive caseload, is defeated by the plain language of the 
  
 50. State v. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 996 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2008). 
 51. See Pub. Defender, 12 So. 3d 798. 
 52. Id. at 801.  
 53. Id. at 801-02.  
 54. Id. at 802. 
 55. Id. at 802-03.  The court added in a footnote what has come to be a Catch-22 
for public defenders.  See id. at 802 n.4 (noting that “as recently as 2007 . . . PD11 has 
received national recognition for its representation of indigent defendants”).  
 56. FLA. STAT. § 27.5303(1)(a) (2009). 
 57. See Pub. Defender, 12 So. 3d at 804 (citing FLA. STAT. § 27.5303(1)(e)).  
 58. Id.   
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statute.”59  According to the court, “[o]nly after an assistant public defender 
proves prejudice or conflict, separate from excessive caseload, may that at-
torney withdraw from a particular case.”60   
Less than a week after the Third District’s ruling, the PD-11 moved pur-
suant to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Florida Constitu-
tion to certify the case to the Florida Supreme Court,61 highlighting six ques-
tions of great public importance: 
Does section 27.5303(1)(d), Florida statutes, prohibit public de-
fenders from declining new cases as well as withdrawing from ex-
isting cases because of excessive workload? 
Is a public defender allowed to decline appointments to cases if 
there is a judicial determination that its workload does not permit 
the public defender to proffer representation conforming to the 
Florida Rules of Professional Responsibility? 
If declining new cases is construed as withdrawing from existing 
cases, is a public defender allowed to withdraw if there is a judicial 
determination that its workload does not permit the public defender 
to proffer representation conforming to the Florida Rules of Pro-
fessional Responsibility? 
Must public defenders certify and litigate conflicts based on exces-
sive workload only on a case-by-case basis? 
Do the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibiting excessive work-
load apply only to individual assistant public defenders and not the 
public defender acting as supervisor of such assistant public de-
fenders? 
May the State Attorney who is prosecuting a criminal case have 
standing in a judicial determination of whether a public defender 
has an ethical conflict in defending against that prosecution by rea-
son of excessive caseload?62 
The state thereafter moved to reject the PD-11’s certification motion, 
arguing that the Third District’s ruling was justified, offering several rea-
  
 59. Id. at 805.  
 60. Id. at 806. 
 61. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v).  
 62. Motion to Certify Questions of Great Public Importance at 5, State v. Pub. 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Nos. 3D08-2272, 3D08-2537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
May 19, 2009), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/Mo-
tion_to_Certify_Questions.pdf.  
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sons.63  First, Florida Supreme Court precedent required actual evidence of 
prejudice to justify withdrawal, which was lacking in the instant case.64  Next, 
the PD-11 phrased its questions in terms of “workload,” yet relied solely 
upon caseload analysis, raising an evidentiary issue unaddressed by the dis-
trict court.65  Finally, the case implicated issues unique to the PD-11 felony 
management system, which were distinct from those of public defenders 
elsewhere in the state.66 
On July 1, 2009, the PD-11 filed notice of intent to invoke discretionary 
jurisdiction from the Florida Supreme Court to review the Third District’s 
ruling.67  After considering the petition for over ten months, the Supreme 
Court, after adjournment of the legislative session, accepted jurisdiction over 
the case.68  As of late summer 2010, however, the court had not calendared 
the matter for oral argument.  
While the petition for jurisdiction was pending, the PD-11 filed a new 
action on August 3, 2009, this time moving to withdraw from (not decline) a 
particular case – that of Antoine Bowens, who faced felony prosecution for 
allegedly selling cocaine near a school.69  The motion alleged that Bowens’ 
appointed counsel faced a conflict of interest created by an excessive case-
load and sought a declaration of the unconstitutionality of section 27.5303.70  
  
 63. State of Florida’s Response to Motion to Certify, State v. Pub. Defender, 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Nos. 3D08-2272, 3D08-2537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 22, 
2009), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/State_of_Flor-
idas_Response_to_Motion_to_Certify.pdf.. 
 64. Id. at 1-2. 
 65. Id. at 2. 
 66. Id. at 3-4. 
 67. Notice of Intent to Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction, State v. Pub. Defender, 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Nos. 3D08-2272, 3D08-2537, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 1, 
2009) (asserting as jurisdictional bases that “(1) this Court’s decision expressly affects 
classes of constitutional officers; and (2) this Court’s decision expressly and directly 
conflicts with prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida on the same question of 
law.”), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/Notice_of_Int-
ent_to_Invoke_Discretionary_Jurisdiction.pdf.    
 68. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, No. SC09-1181, (Fla. May 
19, 2010), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/Order_Ac-
cepting_Jurisdiction.pdf.   
 69. Assistant Public Defender’s Motion to Withdraw and to Declare Section 
27.5303(1)(d), Florida Statutes, Unconstitutional, State v. Bowens, No. F09-019364 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 3, 2009) available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWo-
rkload/Filed_08-03-09_Motion_to_Withdraw.pdf; see also id. at 2 (noting that “PD-
11 is seeking discretionary review of the appellate court’s decision in the Supreme 
Court of Florida.  In the meantime, [the] undersigned counsel and his clients require 
immediate relief from a crushing caseload.”).  
 70. Id. at 9 (“[T]he undersigned is uncertain about his ability to withdraw from 
this case and seeks a declaration that [the statute] is unconstitutional.  The Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal did not pass on the constitutionality of the statute as it inter-
preted it.”).  
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The motion was filed by Assistant Public Defender Jay Kolsky, a respected 
litigator with thirty-six years of experience prosecuting and defending cases.71  
According to evidence put before the court, Kolsky had between 105 and 164 
pending “C” felony (mostly third degree) cases at a time, resulting in him 
handling 525-630 felonies at the end of fiscal year 2009, exclusive of pleas at 
arraignment.72  According to a stipulation of the parties, Kolsky handled a 
total of 736 felonies and 235 pleas at arraignment in fiscal year 2008-2009.73  
Kolsky also had training and other administrative responsibilities, adding to 
his daily work beyond representing clients.74  Kolsky’s caseload, it was as-
serted, exceeded recommended standards by several orders of magnitude.75         
After hearing evidence and arguments, the trial court issued its decision 
on October 23, 2009.76  The court found that, while state and national casel-
oad standards are not alone determinative of whether an excessive caseload 
exists, they serve as “factors to consider in evaluating the genuineness and 
sufficiency” of a claim.77  Kolsky’s caseload, the judge found, “had a detri-
mental effect on his ability to competently and diligently represent and com-
municate with all his clients on an individual basis” from initial arraignment 
onward.78  With regard to petitioner Bowens in particular, Kolsky lacked time 
to meet with Bowens after arraignment to discuss his case or the discovery 
provided by the state, undertake factual investigation, develop mitigation 
information, or file motions, even though Bowens faced potential life impri-
sonment due to a sentence enhancement.79     
Turning to the constitutional challenge of section 27.5303(1)(d), the trial 
court, like the Third District a few months before, avoided a direct assess-
ment.  Invoking Florida’s canon of constitutional avoidance,80 the court sin-
  
 71. Id. at 10.   
 72. Order Denying Public Defender’s Motion to Declare Section 27.5303(1)(d), 
Florida Statutes, Unconstitutional and Granting Public Defender’s Motion to With-
draw at 2, State v. Bowens, No. F09-19364, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 23, 2009) [hereinafter 
Order Denying Motion]. 
 73. Id. at 2-3. 
 74. Id. at 3. 
 75. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Withdraw, at 8, State v. Bo-
wens, No. F09-19364, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 3, 2009 (citing National Advisory Commis-
sion on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommending a maximum of 150 
felony cases per year).    
 76. Order Denying Motion, supra note 72. 
 77. Id. at 3.   
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 4.  
 80. Id. at 6 (noting that it was “mindful that statutes ‘come clothed with a pre-
sumption of constitutionality and must be construed, whenever possible, to effect a 
constitutional outcome.’” (quoting Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
978 So. 2d 134, 139 (Fla. 2008)); see also id. at 6-7 (“Further, it is a ‘settled principle 
of constitutional law that courts should not pass on the constitutionality of statutes if 
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gled out for significance the legislature’s use of the term “solely.”  According 
to the court, the term “is not a prohibition on consideration of excessive ca-
seload as a factor in an attorney’s motion to withdraw; rather[,] the statute 
intends that other considerations be present.”81  The trial court’s reading of 
the statute, combined with the Third District’s requirement that individualized 
prejudice or conflict independent of excessive caseload be shown, allowed 
the court to find the statute constitutionally sound.  There exists, the court 
concluded,  
a cognizable difference between a withdrawal based solely on 
workload, and a withdrawal where an individualized showing is 
made that there is a substantial risk that a defendant’s constitution-
al rights may be prejudiced as a result of workload.  This distinc-
tion allows for judicial relief where prejudice to constitutional 
rights is adequately demonstrated.  Thus subsection (d) is not con-
stitutionally infirm.82  
Having found the statute to permit withdrawal on the basis of individua-
lized proof of prejudice, including that resulting from excessive workload, the 
court proceeded to assess whether its standard was satisfied.  Focusing on the 
Third District’s conclusion that withdrawal is appropriate “when a client is, 
or will be, prejudiced or harmed by the attorney’s ineffective representa-
tion,”83 and referring to the Florida Bar Rules prohibiting a “substantial risk” 
of prejudicial conflict in representation,84 the court agreed with the PD-11 
that prejudice can be demonstrated by the possibility of future harm accruing 
as a result of excessive caseload.  According to the court:  
[I]f an assistant public defender requests permission to withdraw 
from representation of a client based on considerations of exces-
sive caseload, there must be an individualized showing of a sub-
stantial risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client.85  
Applying the standard to the record, the court found sufficient evidence 
that the caseload demands experienced by public defender Kolsky met the 
  
the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other 
grounds.’” (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975)).   
 81. Id. at 7.  
 82. Id. at 8. 
 83. Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit, 12 So. 3d 798, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam)).  
 84. Id. at 8-9 (citing FLA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 4-1.7(a)(2)).  
 85. Id. at 9.  
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burden of showing adequate, individualized proof of prejudice to his repre-
sentation of Bowens.86  
The trial court’s Solomonic decision to uphold the constitutionality of 
section 27.5303(1)(d) yet allow Kolsky’s motion to withdraw was cross-
appealed by the parties to the Third District Court of Appeal.87  The Third 
District heard arguments on the matter in mid-December 2009 and on July 7, 
2010 issued its opinion reversing the trial court’s decision permitting 
Kolsky’s withdrawal.88  According to the Third District, Bowens failed to 
demonstrate “individualized prejudice or conflict separate from that which 
arises out of an excessive caseload,” and thus withdrawal of counsel was pro-
hibited by section 27.5303(1)(d).89  Without addressing the trial court’s fac-
tual findings of prejudice, the Third District concluded that the record lacked 
evidence of “something substantial or material that Kolsky has or will be 
compelled to refrain from doing.”90  As a result, any prejudice was “specula-
tive” and the withdrawal thus fell within the plain language of the statutory 
prohibition.91  With respect to the statute’s constitutionality, the Third Circuit 
summarily agreed with the trial court’s construction of the statute, yet deemed 
the issue of great public importance, warranting certification of the question 
of its constitutionality to the Florida Supreme Court.92  
III.  W(H)ITHER THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY  
The Miami-Dade excessive caseload litigation raises basic questions 
over the institutional authority of the judiciary to address the chronic under-
funding and excessive caseload problems facing public defenders.  Florida 
courts now face motions from public defenders to decline third-degree felony 
cases (“PD-11 Case No. 1”) and to withdraw from the case of an individual 
accused felon (“PD-11 Case No. 2”), turning on alleged excessive caseloads 
and underfunding.  Unlike earlier litigation seeking to give effect to the prom-
ise of Gideon, the excessive caseload litigation is occurring amid an aggres-
sive effort by the Florida Legislature to limit the judiciary’s constitutional 
oversight and remedial authority, manifest in Florida Statutes section 
  
 86. Id. at 10.  
 87. State’s Petition for Writ of Common Law Certiorari, State v. Bowens, No. 
3D09-3023, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 2009), available at http://www.pdmiami.c-
om/ExcessiveWorkload/States_Petition_for_Writ_of_Common_Law_Certiorari_11-
6-09.pdf; Reply in Support of Cross-Petition for Writ of Common Law Certiorari, 
State v. Bowens, No. 3D09-3023, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/PD11_Repl-y_in_Support_of_Cross-
Petition_for_Writ_of_Certiorari.pdf. 
 88. See State v. Bowens, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 89. Id. at *2.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at *3.  
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27.5303(1)(d), which explicitly prohibits courts from finding a conflict of 
interest “solely upon inadequacy of funding or excess workload.”93  To date, 
Florida courts have shown a distinct reluctance to directly question the legis-
lature’s capacity to infringe upon their institutional role.  Indeed, in the litiga-
tion’s most significant appellate opinion to date, the Third District Court of 
Appeal made clear its reluctance to intervene, stating that the “solution . . . 
lies with the legislature or the internal administration of PD11, not with the 
courts.”94   
Such judicial reluctance is especially notable in Florida, where the state 
constitution expressly ensures co-equal tripartite separation of powers, pro-
viding that “[n]o person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers 
appertaining to either of the other branches . . . .”95  The legislature’s overt 
effort to prohibit withdrawals based on excessive workload and inadequate 
funding plainly infringes on the long-recognized “inherent authority” of Flor-
ida courts to ensure the ethical administration of justice96 and to protect the 
fundamental rights of the criminally accused.97  In the past, the Florida Su-
preme Court has steadfastly defended this zone of judicial authority,98 includ-
ing in the context of excessive caseloads brought on by inadequate funding, 
proclaiming that “courts have the inherent authority to issue orders addressing 
problems such as this”99 – a matter “of constitutional magnitude.”100  With its 
  
 93. FLA. STAT. § 27.5303(1)(d) (2009). 
 94. State v. Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 12 So. 3d 798, 806 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2008).  A concurring opinion was even more vociferous in its aversion, 
calling the PD-11’s action “nothing more than a political question masquerading as a 
lawsuit, and should be dispatched on that basis.”  Id. (Shepherd, J., concurring).  
 95. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 329 (Fla. 
2009) (“In Florida, the constitutional doctrine [of separation of powers] has been 
expressly codified in article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, which not only 
divides state government into three branches but also expressly prohibits one branch 
from exercising the powers of the two other branches.”).  
 96. See Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1978) (“Every 
court has the inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the 
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction . . . .”).  
 97. Id. (“[W]here the fundamental rights of individuals are concerned, the judi-
ciary may not abdicate its responsibility and defer to legislative or administrative 
arrangements . . . The invocation of the doctrine [of inherent judicial power] is most 
compelling when the judicial function at issue is the safe-guarding of fundamental 
rights.”).   
 98. See id. at 136 n.3 (“‘Inherent powers’ of courts have been described as ‘all 
powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial func-
tions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions 
effective.  These powers are inherent in the sense they exist because the court exists . . 
. .”) (citation omitted). 
 99. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit 
Pub. Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 1990).  
 100. In re Pub. Defender’s Certification of Conflict, 709 So. 2d 101, 103 (Fla. 
1998).  
2010] LITIGATING THE GHOST 899 
enactment of section 27.5303(1)(d), the Florida Legislature aggressively 
sought to undercut this authority. 
Excessive caseloads negatively affect the daily work of public defenders 
and the administration of justice, directly implicating the constitutional over-
sight authority of Florida courts.101  The cases allege that PD-11 lawyers are 
unable to provide their indigent clients basic services necessary for the prepa-
ration of their cases, which clearly raises concern relative to the ethical com-
mand of effective representation.102  The cases further allege incapacity to 
provide effective client communication103 and diligent representation,104 and 
Commentary of the Florida Rules of Professional Responsibility expressly 
acknowledges the need of counsel to avoid an excessive caseload.105  Finally, 
excessive caseloads threaten a systematic violation of the basic tenet of client 
loyalty and capacity for independent judgment, namely that a lawyer “shall 
not represent a client if . . . there is a substantial risk that the representation of 
1 or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to 
another client . . . .”106  
The legislature’s effort to limit the ability of courts to regulate the ethi-
cal behavior of public defenders thus unavoidably conflicts with basic separa-
tion of powers principles.  The legislative branch lacks the constitutional au-
thority “to interfere with or impair an attorney in the exercise of his ethical 
duties as an attorney and officer of the court.”107 
Excessive caseloads equally implicate the judiciary’s duty to ensure that 
the fundamental Sixth Amendment right of indigents to effective assistance of 
counsel is satisfied.  The Florida Supreme Court has long recognized the con-
  
 101. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15 (providing Florida Supreme Court the “jurisdic-
tion to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of 
persons admitted”); see also State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Evans, 94 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. 
1957) (noting that “the prescription of ethical standards . . . and the exercise of super-
visory jurisdiction are . . . peculiarly judicial functions”). 
 102. FLA. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 4-1.1 (2006).  
 103. Id. at R.4-1.4. 
 104. Id. at R.4-1.3. 
 105. See id. at R.4-1.3, cmt (“A lawyer’s workload must be controlled so that each 
matter can be handled competently.”).  
 106. Id. at R.4-1.7.  The Rule’s Comment elaborates: 
Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s 
relationship to a client. Conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client . . .  
Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, rec-
ommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action for a client because 
of the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests.  
Id. at cmt. 
 107. Times Publ’g Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1969); see also id. (stating that an “attorney has the right and duty to practice his 
profession in the manner required by the Canons unfettered by clearly conflicting 
legislation which renders the performance of his ethical duties impossible”). 
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nection between excessive caseloads and conflict.  As the court observed in 
1990: 
[w]hen excessive caseload forces the public defender to choose be-
tween the rights of the various indigent criminal defendants he 
represents, a conflict of interest is inevitably created. . . . “The 
rights of defendants in criminal proceedings brought by the state 
cannot be subjected to the fate of choice no matter how rational 
that choice may be because of the circumstances of the situa-
tion.”108  
The court hastened to add that “where the backlog of cases in the public de-
fender’s office is so excessive that there is no possible way he can timely 
handle those cases, it is his responsibility to move the court to withdraw.”109  
The court’s position parallels those taken by the ABA Formal Opinion 06-
441110 and the ABA’s Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System.111 
The obviously strained effort by the trial court and Third District Court 
of Appeal in Bowens to find a saving construction based on the legislature’s 
use of the term “solely” fails to constitutionally redeem the statute.  In con-
struing the law on withdrawals based on conflict of interest, the entirety of the 
  
 108. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit 
Pub. Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1135 (Fla. 1990) (citation omitted).  
 109. Id. at 1138; see also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981) (“Where a 
constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a 
correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.”); Foster v. 
State, 387 So. 2d 344, 345 (Fla. 1980) (“The sixth amendment right to the assistance 
of counsel contemplates legal representation that is effective and unimpaired by the 
existence of conflicting interests . . . .”); Johnson v. State, 6 So. 3d 1262, 1267 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“[C]onflict-free counsel is part of the constitutional provision 
for effective assistance of appellate counsel.”).   
 110. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 
(2006) (recommending that counsel withdraw from existing cases or seek relief from 
new appointments when workload prevents provision of competent and diligent re-
presentation).  
 111. See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE 
DELIVERY SYSTEM Prin. 5 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/lega-
lservices/downloads/sclaid/10principles.pdf (“Counsel’s workload . . . should never 
be so large as to interfere with the rendering of quality representation or lead to a 
breach of ethical obligations, and counsel is obligated to decline appointments above 
such levels.”); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Stnd. 5-
5.3 (1992) (“Courts should not require individuals or programs to accept caseloads 
that will lead to the furnishing of representation lacking in quality or to the breach of 
professional obligations.”), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/stan-
dards/defsvcs_blk.html.  
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statute must be read in pari materia.112  Section 27.5303(1)(a) speaks general-
ly to the issue of withdrawal, providing that “[t]he court shall deny the motion 
to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or 
the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client.”113  In turn, sec-
tion 27.5303(3) provides that “[i]n determining whether or not there is a con-
flict of interest, the public defender . . . shall apply the standards contained in 
the Uniform Standards for Use in Conflict of Interest Cases . . . .”114  These 
standards, however, make no mention of the potential conflict arising out of 
excessive caseload or underfunding.  As the Third District correctly observed 
in PD-11 Case No. 1, “the only conflicts addressed [in the Standards] are 
conflicts involving codefendants and certain kinds of witnesses or parties.  
Conspicuously absent are conflicts arising from underfunding, excessive ca-
seload, or the prospective inability to adequately represent a client.”115  In 
short, the Florida Legislature impermissibly sought to deny courts the power 
to allow withdrawal of counsel as a result of excessive caseload, the adverse 
effects of which serve as a judicially recognized basis for conflict.116    
Furthermore, the Third District’s insistence that prejudice be shown on a 
retrospective “case-by-case” basis lacks merit.  As the U.S. Supreme Court 
made clear in United States v. Cronic,117 the companion case to the Court’s 
landmark decision in Strickland v. Washington,118 criminal defendants need 
not wait until they suffer actual prejudice in order to raise a Sixth Amend-
  
 112. See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Contractpoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d 
1260, 1265-66 (Fla. 2008).  
 113. FLA. STAT. § 27.5303(1)(a) (2009). 
 114. § 27.5303(1)(e).  
 115. State v. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 12 So. 3d 798, 804 (Fla. 
Dist. App. 2009).  
 116. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
 117. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).  
 118. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  It is worth noting that the Strickland two-prong re-
quirement of deficient performance and actual prejudice to an individual defendant is 
itself an inapt standard.  The standard is applicable in the post-conviction context and 
seeks to protect the finality of judgments.  Id. at 690.  See also Luckey v. Harris, 860 
F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988): 
[The Strickland] standard is inappropriate for a civil suit seeking prospec-
tive relief.  The sixth amendment protects rights that not affect the out-
come of a trial.  Thus, deficiencies that do not meet the “ineffectiveness” 
standard may nonetheless violate a defendant’s rights under the sixth 
amendment.  In the post-trial context, such errors may be deemed harm-
less because they did not affect the outcome of the trial.  Whether an ac-
cused has been prejudiced by the denial of a right is an issue that relates to 
relief – whether the defendant is entitled to have his or her conviction 
overturned – rather than to the question of whether such a right exists and 
can be protected prospectively. 
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ment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.119  Nor should counsel be 
placed in the ethically and professionally untenable position of essentially 
having to admit to an ethical or constitutional violation.120  Rather, some fac-
tual scenarios raise such obvious concern that a presumption of prejudice 
rightfully attaches, such as the PD-11’s representations in the excessive case-
load litigation.    
In Florida, use of a prospective, not retrospective, approach to assessing 
prejudice enjoys particular support.  In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court con-
cluded that case backlog warrants withdrawal when it “is so excessive that 
there is no possible way” that matters can be handled effectively.121  This 
conclusion, along with the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, suggests 
use of the approach in which counsel must decline or end representation when 
compliance with the rules is not possible and not wait until harm to a client 
occurs.122  
Finally, the Third District’s conclusion that the PD-11’s effort to de-
cline, not withdraw from, cases is an impermissible circumvention of the 
plain language of section 27.5303(1)(d) is unfounded.  By its terms, the sta-
tute speaks only to “withdrawal,” not declination,123 and Florida courts have 
long recognized the difference between attorney withdrawal and declinations, 
urging declinations as preferable.  Concurring in Escambia County v. Behr, 
for instance, then-Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice England stated that: 
[b]y requiring public defenders to decline new representation on 
the basis of excess caseload, rather than to withdraw from pending 
proceedings on that ground, the trial courts of this state will not on-
  
 119. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 667.  For a helpful discussion of the inappropriateness of 
Strickland’s ex post standard in the context of claims challenging the constitutional 
effects of chronic underfunding, see Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of 
Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 
1732-33 (2005).  
 120. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE 
DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 143 n.179 (2009).  
 121. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit 
Pub. Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1138 (Fla. 1990). 
 122. See FLA. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 4-1.16; Hagopian v. Justice Admin. 
Comm’n, 18 So. 3d 625, 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] lawyer may seek to 
avoid appointment by a court to represent a person when ‘representing the client is 
likely to result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or of the law.’”) 
(citation omitted); see, e.g., Scott v. State, 991 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2008) (“Conflicts of interest are best addressed before a lawyer laboring under such a 
conflict does any harm to his or her client(s)’s interests.  Any prejudicial effect on the 
adequacy of counsel’s representation is presumed harmful.”). 
 123. See Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 65 (Fla. 2005) (“In at-
tempting to discern legislative intent, we first look to the actual language used in the 
statute.”). 
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ly prevent delays in the administration of the criminal justice sys-
tem, but will also avoid the creation of a different standard of re-
presentation in public defender offices than among private attor-
neys.124  
Indeed, “the acceptance of additional cases where an existing caseload prec-
ludes adequate representation may subject an attorney to disciplinary ac-
tion.”125  The ABA has also endorsed this approach.126 
If and when the Florida Supreme Court addresses the constitutionality of 
section 27.5303(1)(d), the justices can be bolstered by their own precedent 
defying legislative overreach with respect to the delivery of indigent defense.  
In Makemson v. Martin County, for instance, the Florida Supreme Court 
struck down a statute capping attorneys’ fees for indigent defense, deeming 
the statute unconstitutional because it “curtail[ed] the court’s inherent power 
to ensure adequate representation of the criminally accused.”127  Today, how-
ever, the accumulating institutional reluctance of the Florida judiciary to 
forthrightly address the constitutionality of Florida Statutes section 
27.5303(1)(d) underscores that we live in different times.    
  
 124. 384 So. 2d 147, 150-51 (Fla. 1980) (England, C.J., concurring).  
 125. Id. at 151 n.2. 
 126. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 
(2006) (“A lawyer’s primary ethical duty is owed to existing clients.  Therefore, a 
lawyer must decline to accept new cases, rather than withdraw from existing cases, if 
the acceptance of a new case will result in her workload becoming excessive.”).  
 127. 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 1986).  The court added: “[W]e must focus upon 
the criminal defendant whose rights are often forgotten in the heat of this bitter dis-
pute.  In order to safeguard that individual’s rights, it is our duty to firmly and unhesi-
tatingly resolve any conflicts between the treasury and fundamental constitutional 
rights in favor of the latter.”  Id. at 1113.  A similarly stalwart expression of judicial 
resolve is found in the New York Court of Appeals’ recent decision awarding class-
wide relief based on deficient funding, where the majority offered that:  
 [i]t is, of course, possible that a remedy in this action would necessitate 
the appropriation of funds and perhaps, particularly in a time of scarcity, 
some reordering of legislative priorities.  But this does not amount to an 
argument upon which a court might be relieved of its essential obligation 
to provide a remedy for violation of a fundamental constitutional right. 
 We have consistently held that enforcement of a clear constitutional or 
statutory mandate is the proper work of the courts, and it would be odd if 
we made an exception in the case of a mandate as well-established and as 
essential to our constitutional integrity as the one requiring the State to 
provide legal representation to indigent criminal defendants . . . . 
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 227 (N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted).      
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Today, it is widely recognized that insufficient funding by state legisla-
tures is a root cause of the ongoing indigent defense crisis.128  In Florida, 
anxiety over the possibility that courts might intervene and seek to ensure 
adequate funding themselves has been so pronounced as to inspire a state 
constitutional amendment expressly denying the judiciary the “power to fix 
appropriations.”129  Of course, the amendment merely states a separation of 
powers truism, itself lacking in practical effect given the consistent respect 
Florida’s courts have shown the legislature’s power of the purse.130   
The PD-11 excessive caseload litigation itself respects the distinction 
and asks that the Florida judiciary step up, as it has in past decades, to assert 
its inherent institutional authority, which the Florida Supreme Court has rec-
ognized as “crucial to the survival of the judiciary as an independent, func-
tioning and co-equal branch of government.”131  Although technically bereft 
of spending power, Florida courts possess the capacity to effectuate their 
constitutional authority indirectly.  “The doctrine of inherent judicial power 
as it relates to the practice of compelling the expenditure of funds,” the Flori-
da Supreme Court offered in 1978, “has developed as a way of responding to 
inaction or inadequate action that amounts to a threat of the court’s ability to 
make effective their jurisdiction. . . . The invocation of the doctrine is most 
compelling when the judicial function at issue is the safe-guarding of funda-
mental rights.”132  
In the past, the Florida Supreme Court did not flinch from expressing its 
concern over the indigent defense crisis, signaling that it stood ready to en-
force its authority even at the cost of releasing indigent defendants.133  While 
resorting to the drastic measure would “not alleviate the [underfunding] situa-
  
 128. See Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the 
Delivery of Indigent Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 293, 309 (2002) 
(“Lack of funding for the defense function is certainly the single greatest factor ad-
versely affecting quality.”); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing 
and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 816 (“The most fundamental reason for the poor quality or 
absence of legal services for the poor in the criminal justice system is the refusal of 
governments to allocate sufficient funds for indigent defense programs.”).  
 129. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 14(d).  
 130. See, e.g., In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judi-
cial Circuit Pub. Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1136 (Fla. 1990) (“[I]t is not the function 
of this Court to decide what constitutes adequate funding and then order the legisla-
ture to appropriate such an amount.  Appropriation of funds for the operation of gov-
ernment is a legislative function.”).  
 131. Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1978).  
 132. Id.  
 133. See, e.g., Order on Prosecution, 561 So. 2d at 1138-39 (noting that, while it 
lacked the power to allocate funds for criminal defense, if funds were not provided, 
that court would order immediate release pending appeal of certain bondable felons).  
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tion,” the court observed two decades ago that “it will ameliorate the hardship 
on [indigents].  There can be no justification for their continued incarceration 
during the time that their constitutional rights are being ignored or vi-
olated.”134  Allowing potentially dangerous indigent criminal defendants to 
roam free would also most assuredly get the attention of Floridians and their 
legislators.  Whether this same judicial fortitude and capacity for brinkman-
ship will be shown today, a time when the Florida Legislature struggles with 
unprecedented budgetary deficits and evinces not only an apparent lack of 
concern for the judiciary135 but also an amenability to underfund public de-
fender offices that borders on the politically vindictive,136 remains to be seen.  
The reasons underlying the legislative political process failure account-
ing for the sustained indigent defense crisis are no secret.137  Less apparent, 
yet more troubling for Florida, the one-time home of Clarence Gideon,138 is 
the prospect that the judiciary will ignore an undisguised usurpation by legis-
lators of its duty to help ensure satisfaction of the state’s constitutional obli-
gation to provide adequate criminal defense for the state’s indigents.  Where-
as in the past, separation of powers protected legislative prerogative against 
  
 134. Id. at 1139; see also Hatten v. State, 561 So. 2d 562, 565 n.3 (Fla. 1990) 
(expressing its hope that “the legislature will be prompted to . . . alleviate a situation 
which has become intolerable.  Should this situation continue, there remains open to 
this Court the option of releasing pending appeal any indigent convicted felons oth-
erwise bondable.  While this would not solve the problem, it would at least ameliorate 
the hardship caused.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Gary Blankenship & Jan Pudlow, State Attorneys, PDs Also Strug-
gle with Budget Hits, FLA. B. NEWS, May 15, 2008. 
 136. See, e.g., Richard Hersch et al., Court Funding, FLA. B. NEWS, Sept. 1, 2008 
(quoting State Senator Victor Crist, Chair of Criminal and Civil Justice Appropria-
tions Committee, that “most [public defender clients] are guilty” and therefore 
“should not skate” as a result of appointed counsel).  
 137. See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex 
Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 252 (1997) (“Legislatures, 
responding to voters fearful of crime, have no incentive to devote scarce resources to 
the defense function rather than to additional police or prison space. Public choice 
theory clearly predicts what scholars have consistently observed:  the defense function 
is starved for resources.”); Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Liti-
gated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2062 (2000) (“The poli-
tical process failure in this area is unsurprising, for indigent defendants, by definition, 
lack the financial and political capital necessary to pursue effective reform efforts.”).   
 138. Gideon died in 1972 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, and his remains were re-
turned to his hometown, Hannibal, Missouri.  He was initially interred in an un-
marked grave but a marker was eventually placed at the site as a result of efforts by 
the American Civil Liberties Union.  Janice Kalmar, Man Who Changed Justice Sys-
tem Called “No-Good Punk,” “Hero” is Without Honor in Hometown, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 24, 1985, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1985-02-24/news/mn-
24495_1_justice-system.  
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judicial reform efforts,139 today it holds promise in Florida as a sword for the 
judiciary, as what Charles Sabel and William Simon extol as an “accountabil-
ity-enforcing” measure140 to affirmatively preserve the courts’ institutional 
role in Florida’s tripartite system of governance.    
While the outcome of the Miami-Dade excessive caseload litigation is 
most anxiously awaited by Floridians, it will doubtlessly also figure in the 
national debate.  After a period of nationwide inaction,141 the litigation marks 
the first instance in which overburdened and underfunded public defenders 
have heeded ABA Formal Opinion 06-441 by seeking to withdraw from or 
decline additional cases, opening the door to future potential litigation.  As a 
consequence, much as with Gideon itself, the future of indigent reform litiga-
tion may well bear connection to the Sunshine State. 
 
  
 139. See, e.g., Mandel v. Meyers, 629 P.2d 935, 948 (Cal. 1981); State v. Peart, 
621 So. 2d 780, 786-87 (La. 1993).  
 140. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How 
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1090 (2004).  
 141. See Norman Lefstein & Georgia Vagenas, Restraining Excessive Defender 
Caseloads: ABA Ethics Committee Requires Action, CHAMPION, Dec. 30, 2006, at 10, 
18 (noting that the Opinion “created barely a ripple among defenders throughout the 
country”). 
